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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* • * * * * * * 
I' ''"'1' CORPORATION, a New 
'ur f)Qfdt ion, 
Appellant, 
vs . 
. SALT LAKE COUNTY, et a 1., 
Respondent. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Cross-claimants, 
vs. 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, et al., 
Cross-defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
Supreme Court Case 
No. 18972 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation, an owner of property 
and a taxpayer in Salt Lake County, Utah, brought the present 
action against salt Lake County, its treasurer and assessor 
!hereinafter "County defendants" J, and the State Tax Commission 
of Utah, its Board of commissioners and the members thereof 
!hereinafter "State Tax Commission" J challenging the constitu-
tionality of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1981), repealed 
'Interim Supp. 1983) and seeking a refund of a portion of its 
1'181 property taxes paid under protest pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-11-11 ( 1974 & 1981 Supp.). Kennecott claimed that 
section 59-5-4.5's directive that county assessors "take 80% of 
the value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of tr1e 
property as its reasonable fair cash value for purposes of 
assessment" violated the mandate of Article XIII, Section 3 of 
the Utah Constitution, which required "a uniform and equal rate 
of assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money. 1 Because Section 
59-5-4,5 did not apply to property such as Kennecott's that is 
assessed by the State Tax Commission, Kennecott claimed that 
the resulting disparity in rate of taxation was unconstitu-
tional. 
In response, the County defendants filed a counter-
claim againt Kennecott, alleging that Kennecott's property has 
been assessed at less than fair cash value. The County defen-
dants also filed two cross-claims against the State Tax Commis-
sion. The first cross-claim alleged that the State Tax Commis-
sion failed to assess plaintiff's property at its full cash 
11n 1982, the Utah electorate passed Proposition 1, which 
amended Article XIII, S 2 to provide that the Legislature could 
exempt up to 45 percent of the value of county-assessed prop-
erty from taxation. There is no question but what Proposition 
1 has sanctioned precisely the kind of tax reduction at issue 
Vi 
Al 
pr 
fO 
Ju 
An 
le 
ti 
in this case. Thus, this case is limited to the question of 1'h 
whether Kennecott will or will not be able to get a refund on "1' 
portions of its 1981 and 1982 taxes, which were paid prior to ch, 
the effective date of Proposition 1. •r 1 
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v• ! ue. Although the County defendants admit that the Commis-
'" .-nmrl ied with the statutory formula for assessing mining 
'i 1 cs contained in Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 ( 1974 & 1981 
_, 1·1 in making those assessments, they assert that Utah Code 
S 59-5-57 (1974 & 1981 Supp.) is unconstitutional because 
1 1 does not arrive at the full cash value of plaintiff's mining 
The second cross-claim sought access to certain 
a>sessment records of the State Tax Commission. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The claims came before the Third Judicial District 
:ourt, the Honorable Judge Phillip A. Fishler presiding, on 
cross motions for summary judgment on Kennecott's claim, and 
for dismissal of County defendant's counter and cross-claims. 
Jud3e Fishler rejected Kennecott's claim, and found Utah Code 
Ann. S 59-5-4.5 constitutional as a "legitimate attempt by the 
legislature to increase the 'uniformity' of all property valua-
tion methods,• since the "purpose ••• was to correct the 
2utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 reads, in pertinent part: 
all metalliferous mines and mining 
claims shall be assessed at $10.00 per 
acre and in addition thereto at a value equal 
to two times the average net annual proceeds 
thereof. 
"hat sect ion further provides that "machinery used in mining 
a11d all property or surface improvements• are assessed based on 
!heir reasonable fair cash value, just as is non-mining prop-
uty generally. 
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tendency of the comparable sales method and the cost appraisal 
method to 'overvalue' property, in comparison with 0U1Pr 
methods of valuation.• The District Court also granted Kenrie-
cott 's and the state Tax Commission's motions to dismiss 
County defendants' counter and cross-claims, finding that the 
County lacked standing to maintain those claims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Kennecott and the County defendants both filed Notices 
of Appeal from Judge Fishler's decision. In a stipulation 
dated January 31, 1983, all of the parties to this action 
agreed that the issues relevant to Kennecott's claim that Utah 
Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1981), repealed (Interim supp. 
1983) is unconstitutional have been fully and fairly presented 
to this Court in the case of Rio Algom Corporation, et al. v. 
San Juan County, et al., No. 18782 (hereinafter "Rio 
case•). Pursuant to that stipulation, this Court ordered that 
the pending decision in the Rio Algom case would control the 
appeal of Kennecott's claim. For this reason, this appeal is 
limited to the District Court's dismissal of the County defen-
dants' counter and cross-claims. 
The County defendants seek somewhat inconsistent 
relief on appeal. On the counterclaim against Kennecott, they 
seek a judicial determination of the value of Kennecott's prop-
erty, while on the first cross-claim against the State defen-
dants, they seek an order directing the State Tax Commission to 
assess Kennecott's property without reference to Utah Code Ann. 
-4-
09-5-57 ( 1974 & 1981 Supp.), Implicitly thereby the County 
,,,Jants ask this Court to declare Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 
, 1q 1. 1981 supp.) unconstitutional. The relief sought on the 
.crund cross-claim is moot, because the Legislature has by 
sLatute given the County defendants the relief they seek herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' •statement of Facts• is a fair representa-
tlon of the procedural history of this case insofar as that 
statement is confined to facts. However, Kennecott cannot 
accept the County defendants' characterizations of Kennecott's 
legal arguments. Kennecott's disagreements with the County 
defendants on those matters will be dealt with supra as 
'Arguments.• 
ARGUMENT 
I. KENNECOTT HAS PLACED NEITHER ITS VALUA-
TION NOR ITS ASSESSMENT AT ISSUE IN 
THIS LITIGATION, BUT ONLY ITS RATE OF 
TAXATION. 
Perhaps the County defendants' major argument in 
appealing from the dismissal of their counterclaim against 
Kennecott is the notion that by instituting this litigation, 
Kennecott has somehow put its own valuation at issue, and has 
opened the door for a judicial re-inquiry into that valuation. 
That argument, however, proceeds from a false premise. 
To understand the flaw in the County defendants' argu-
rnent, it is necessary to look at some of the basic procedures 
'n Utah property taxation. Most property is assessed by the 
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several county assessors, who commonly use such methods as the 
comparable sales method, which values properties according tr) 
contemporary sales prices for similar property. Certain other 
property, principally mines and public utilities, are required 
by the Utah Constitution to be assessed by the State Tax com-
mission. Utah Const., art. XIII,§ 11. Because each mine is a 
unique property, the sales price, if any, of a particular mine 
might well not bear any relationship to the fair value of a 
nearby mine. Hence, the Utah Legislature long ago decided that 
mining properties would be assessed according to a "net pro-
ceeds" formula, which based the fair cash value of a mine upon 
the mine's profitability. The "net proceeds" method was once 
required by the Utah Constitution, but is now statutory in 
nature. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-57 to -59 (1974 & 1981 Supp.). 
Irrespective of which entity does the assessing or 
which method is used, taxation is a multi-step process. First, 
a determination is made of the actual value of the property. 
Second, the property is assessed at 20 percent of that actual 
value. Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-1 ( 1979, as amended). Once a 
county has adopted a budget, it determines the total assessed 
value of property subject to taxation within its borders. It 
then simply di vi des the budget amount into the assessed valua-
tion in order to determine what tax must be collected from each 
parcel of property. 
-6-
That brief description of the taxation process is 
,,i 1al to understanding precisely what Kennecott did and did 
""' rut into issue in this litigation. Kennecott challenged 
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 
JqBJJ, repealed (Interim supp. 1983) on the basis that its 
,J 1 rective that county assessors arbitrarily reduce their 
assessments by 20 percent violated the requirements of uniform 
assessment and taxation contained in art. XIII, S 3. 
A hypothetical example may help illustrate the exact 
nature of Kennecott's legal challenge. Let us suppose that in 
a mythical Utah county, there were only two pieces of taxable 
property, a ranch and a mine. Let us suppose that the county 
assessor determined that the ranch was worth $100,000 on the 
current market, based upon the recent sale of a similar ranch 
just across the county line. Now let us suppose that the State 
Tax Commission, applying the net proceeds formula required by 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-57 ( 1974 & 1981 Supp.), determined that 
the mine was also worth $100,000.00. Under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1981), repealed (Interim supp. 1983), the 
county assessor would then have to arbitrarily take 80 percent 
of the value of the ranch, or $80,000.00, as its value for pur-
poses of assessment. Then, the assessor would multiply the 
resulting cash va 1 ues of each property by 2 0 percent to deter-
,r1ne assessed valuation under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (1979, as 
amended). The result would be that the mine would then be 
taxed on an assessed value of $20,000.00, while the ranch would 
-7-
be taxed on an assessed value of $16,000.00. No matter what 
mill levy were applied, the mine would pay 20 percent more 10 
taxes than would the ranch because of the reduction in valua-
tion mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 1981), 
repealed (Interim supp. 1983). Without that reduction, of 
course, the mine and ranch would pay the same amount of tax. 
Thus, the lowering of the ranch's tax accomplished by Section 
59-5-4.5 would inevitably raise the mine's tax. 
It was that statutory manipulation of valuation, and 
the resultant disparity in taxation, that Kennecott chal-
lenged. Kennecott did not challenge the dollar amount at which 
anyone's property was valued. Rather, it challenged the con-
stitutionality of a statute which had the effect of assessing 
county-assessed properties at 16 percent of cash value, while 
assessing State-assessed property at 20 percent of cash value. 
Conceptually, Kennecott's case is no different than it would 
have been had a statute directed counties to arbitrarily impose 
a 20 percent higher mill levy on certain properties than on 
others. The legality of such a statute could be challenged 
without challenging the underlying valuation processes, and 
that is precisely what Kennecott has done in this case. 
The County defendants' assertion that Kennecott has 
placed its value in issue is an argument that could cut both 
ways, and with a vengeance. To see why, let us look again at 
our mythical county. suppose that our miner, believing it 
unfair that he should have to pay 20 percent more tax on a 
-8-
'''!.000 mine than his neighbor paid on a $100,000 ranch, filed 
1...iwsuit. If the mythical defendants took the same position 
0 ,, lhese real ones have done, they would "defend" the suit by 
asserting that the mine was in fact worth more than 
$100,000.00, and demanding that the miner refute those asser-
tions before proceeding. But why could not the miner then ask 
the defendants, in turn, to prove that the ranch was worth only 
$100,000.00? 
Kennecott could, logically, file the same "counter-
counterclaim" in this real lawsuit. If the County defendants 
claim that Kennecott is "under-assessed" Kennecott's answer 
must be, "compared to what?" That would bring the County's 
valuation of hundreds of thousands of properties into issue. 
such a result obviously flies in the face of common sense. 
fortunately, however, such a result is also highly unnecessary, 
because Kennecott's case can be decided without reference to 
questions of valuation, and was indeed so decided below. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Kennecott has not 
placed its valuation at issue by instituting this litigation. 
The counterclaim against Kennecott cannot be maintained on that 
ground. 
I I. THE COUNTY DEFENDANTS LACK STANDING TO 
BRING THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST KENNE-
COTT, AND EVEN IF THEY HAD STANDING, 
THEY SEEK RELIEF THAT THIS COURT CANNOT 
GRANT. 
The county defendants seek not only to place Kenne-
cott 's valuation at issue, but seek to recover any taxes that 
-9-
may be due as a result of such a re-valuation. The St at r 
defendants argued persuasively below that the County defendants 
lack standing to challenge the assessments of the State Tax 
Commission. Kennecott agrees with those arguments. If the 
County defendants cannot challenge the State Tax Commission• s 
valuation of Kennecott's property directly, then they plainly 
cannot do so indirectly by bringing a claim against Kennecott, 
because Kennecott is entitled to rely on the legality of the 
State Tax Commission valuations. 
The relief County defendants seek on their counter-
claim is simply not available to them. They ask this Court to 
remand the matter, and direct the trial court to determine 
Kennecott's proper valuation for 1981. However, such an order 
is beyond the powers of this Court. The State Tax Commission's 
duties of assessing mines and public utilities are Constitu-
tional, mandated by Utah Const. art. XIII, § 11. That Consti-
tutional delegation of function exclusively to the Tax Commis-
sion must be respected. 
In State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P. 2d 25 (Utah 1938), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned two statutes that effectively removed 
the function of assessing utilities from the State Tax Commis-
sion and assigned that function to the Public Utilities Commis-
sion. In interpreting Article XIII section 11 of the Utah Con-
stitution, this Court said: 
-10-
If the discretion and power of the Tax Com-
mission had been given it by the Legislature 
under its plenary power over taxation, then 
the legislature could withdraw part or all 
of the authority which it had delegated, but 
in this state, the State Tax Commission has 
vested in it by the State Constitution the 
power to assess utilities. To the extent 
that such power depends on constitutional 
provision, the legislature is without power 
to deprive the Tax Commission of any of its 
authority. 
[T)he provisions of § 11 [of article 
XIII of the Utah Constitution) specifically 
vests the power of assessing utilities in 
the State Tax Commission. Therefore, that 
specific provision must be considered as a 
limitation on the power of the legislature 
to place the assessing power in any other 
off ice or commission. 
!".. at 3 8. Thus, even the Legislature, which has otherwise 
plenary power over taxation, cannot strip the State Tax Commis-
sion of its constitutionally vested power to assess utilities. 
The same constitutional provision granting the Tax Commission 
the exclusive power to assess utilities also applies to mines. 
If the Legislature cannot alter that jurisdictional grant in 
the absence of a constitutional change, neither can this 
Court. Thus, it would be unconstitutional for the trial court 
to value Kennecott's properties. Because the County defendants 
seek unconstitutional action by way of relief on their counter-
claim, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
'he rounterclaim. 
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III. THE COUNTY HAS NO IMPLil::D OR INHERENT 
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE KENNECOTT'S VALUTION 
BY COUNTERCLAIM. 
The County defendants' argument that they have an 
implied or inherent right to contest Kennecott's valuation by 
means of a counterclaim appears to follow primarily from the 
false premise that Kennecott has placed its valuation at 
issue. The County defendants' argument is that if Kennecott 
can come into court and challenge the State Tax Commission's 
valuation of Kennecott's property, which challenge, if success-
ful, could be detrimental to County revenues, then the County 
must be empowered to not only defend the state's valuation but 
to seek a higher valuation. That argument is seriously flawed 
in several respects. 
First, as has been pointed out, Kennecott has not 
placed its valuation or anyone else's valuation at issue. The 
County is not being required to defend any of its actions. 
Rather, Kennecott is challenging the constitutionality of a tax 
statute. The County defendants were named only because they 
were recipients of the tax money in question, and Kennecott's 
prayer for relief would operate against the county. In 
essence, the County is something of a bystander. Although 
Kennecott does not dispute the County's genuine interest in the 
outcome of this litigation, Kennecott's dispute is not really 
with the County, but rather with the Legislature. Hence, the 
County's argument that if it is put on the defensive it must be 
-12-
"Pd to fight back is inapplicable because the premise is 
, IJP • 
Second, the County's argument that it has implied 
po1o1er to raise the issue of Kennecott's valuation via counter-
claim is poorly taken. That argument appears to be based 
en t i r e 1 y on an Ar i z on a case , _P_i_m_a __ __ _n""i-'-n"'"g 
20., 119 Ariz. 111, 579 P.2d 1081 (1978). In that case, the 
Anzona supreme Court held that the State Department of Revenue 
could not seek to have the taxpayer's valuation increased in a 
court appeal from an administrative decision because the State 
did not file a notice of appeal from that decision. The County 
defendants read that case as holding that a judicial appeal was 
d1ssallowed only because the proper appellate procedure was not 
followed. They then asked this court to reason negatively that 
if there is no statutory appeal procedure by which the County 
can seek an increase in the State Tax Commission's valuation, 
it must therefore be allowed to do so judicially. 
The County defendants are asking this Court to engage 
in some imaginative mental gymnastics. This Court would first 
nave to agree that the County defendants lack standing to 
in1t1ate a protest of the State Tax Commission's valuation, 
because if the county has standing to initiate a protest, the 
__ County case holds that the valuation issue cannot be 
'•JlSed by a counterclaim. If the County lacks standing, then 
ll1e Court would have to reason that by denying the County the 
-13-
standing to initiate review of a State Tax Commission valua-
tion, the Legislature had implicitly granted the County 
standing to raise such issues by way of counterclaim. Kenne-
cott believes it would be far more sensible to hold that if the 
Legislature meant to deny the County standing to initiate a 
protest of State valuation, the Legislature also meant to deny 
the county standing to do so in the context of a counterclaim. 
The County also argues that in the absence of express 
legislation of the contrary, it is inherently entitled to chal-
lenge Kennecott's valuation simply because it has inherent 
power 
cite 
to protect its fiscal 
State v. Hutchinson, 
interests. 
624 P.2d 
proposition that all county powers 
The County defendants 
1116 (Utah 1980) for the 
should be liberally con-
strued. Kennecott 
that far. In that 
does not believe the Hutchinson case goes 
case, this Court liberally interpreted a 
county's statutory power to pass ordinances. The case did not 
deal with the taxing power, which, as a general proposition, is 
strictly construed against the taxing authority and in favor of 
the taxpayer. 
Moreover, the Hutchinson case did not involve a con-
flict between county and state authority. It must be remem-
bered that counties are nothing more than political subdivi-
sions of the state, and that it is the state and not the county 
that possesses inherent powers of sovereignty. When the state 
has reserved to itself or to an agency such as the State Tax 
-14-
1,•m1TI1ss1on a function such as assessing mines, it does not 
1 '''"' that a county has inherent power to challenge the 
,Late's exercise of that reserved power. Rather, it is far 
more sensible to suppose that the state placed such power where 
it deemed appropriate, and meant for that power to be exercised 
1n plenary fashion except as otherwise provided by law. (The 
1983 Legislature did otherwise so provide in enacting s.B. 208, 
the legislation discussed infra.) In the absence of a specific 
statute, it does not follow that the County has inherent power 
to challenge the decisions of the State Tax Commission either 
directly or indirectly through a counterclaim against the 
taxpayer. 
Finally, 
demands that they 
Kennecott. Their 
be in a •no-lose• 
the County defendants argued that justice 
be able to bring a counterclaim against 
argument is that otherwise, Kennecott would 
position in this litigation. However, there 
is nothing particularly unusual about that situation. In con-
stitutional litigation such as this, governmental entities are 
virtually always in the posture of defending an enactment, with 
no possibility of gain. In a typical tax case, where, unlike 
here, valuation is at issue, the judicial proceedings are 
basically appeals from an administrative decision. An appel-
lant in any judicial proceeding is virtually always in a 
position--the appellate body may affirm the decision 
0r grant relief to the appellant, but would not, under ordinary 
-15-
circumstances, both affirm and grant even further relief to the 
party that prevailed origi11ally. Thus, the County defenrlilr,r 
must do more than simply argue that they are entitled 
increase the stakes whenever a citizen brings a lawsuit. 
Modern litigation, especially against a governmental entity, is 
not merely an intellectualized version of trial by combat in 
which •fairness• demands that both parties have an equal risk 
of loss. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the County defen-
dants' arguments that they must be allowed to bring a counter-
claim against Kennecott should fail. The counterclaim was 
correctly dismissed below, and this Court should affirm that 
dismissal. 
IV. THE FIRST CROSS-CLAIM SHOULD BE DIS-
MISSED BECAUSE THE COUNTY DEFEtlDANTS 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF THEY 
SEEK. 
Under the first cross-claim, the County defendants 
asked this Court to direct the State Tax Commission to deter-
mine the proper valuation for Kennecott's property during 
1981. The State defendants argued persuasively below that the 
County defendants lacked standing to bring such a claim, and 
the trial court agreed. Kennecott concurs with those arguments 
respecting standing, but defers to the State defendants' brief 
and arguments on that point. 
For the future, the standing issue has been resolved 
by the 1983 Legislature. It did so through the enactment of 
-16-
208, which amends Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (Interim supp. 
,, to read as follows: 
If the owner 
by the state tax 
with a showing of 
to the assessment, 
10th day of Apr i 1, 
for a hearing ••• 
of any property assessed 
commission or any county 
reasonable cause objects 
either may, before the 
apply to the commission 
The tax commission shall set a time for 
hearing the objection from April 10 until 
April 22. At the hearing the tax commission 
may increase, lower or sustain the assess-
ment, if the commission finds an error in 
the assessment or if it is necessary to 
e ualize the assessment with other similarl 
assesse property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (1983, as amended) (underscored par-
tions added by 1983 amendments). The new legislation then, 
gives counties the same rights taxpayers have always had to 
protest assessments of the State Tax Commission. But the 
legislation also imposes the same time limitations on counties 
as have always been imposed on taxpayers. 
The County defendants in this case have argued that 
even prior to the passage of S.B. 208, they enjoyed implicit 
standing to challenge State Tax Commission assessments. While 
a contrary interpretation of legislative intent would be more 
sensible, particularly because taxing statutes are to be 
strictly construed, Kennecott would also point out that the 
County defendants are seeking implicit rights without corres-
µundlng implicit obligations. If, prior to the passage of S.B. 
1ll8, the counties have always implicitly enjoyed the 
-17-
standing as taxpayers to challenge State Tax Commission assesc-
ments, then it should follow that the counties have alsri 
implicitly been under the same time limitations. Because the 
County defendants made no protest of Kennecott's 1981 assess-
ment by the 10th day of April, they cannot now do so. The 
relief the County defendants seek in their first cross-claim is 
not legally available, and this court should affirm dismissal 
of that cross-claim. 
v. THE COUNTY DEFENDANTS MAY 
RE-VALUATION OF KENNECOTT'S 
FOR PRIOR YEARS. 
NOT SEEK 
PROPERTY 
In addition to seeking reassessment of Kennecott's 
property for 1981, the County defendants also seek a re-valua-
tion and re-taxation for the five preceding years. That 
request is based on Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-17 (1974), which 
provides: 
Any property discovered by the assessor 
to have escaped assessment may be assessed 
at any time as far back as five years prior 
to the time of discovery • 
Kennecott does not believe that provision applies to this 
case. There is no meaningful allegation that any of Kenne-
cott 's property has escaped assessment at any time not with-
standing what County defendants claim in their brief to be 
•uncontroverted evidence• to the contrary. The County defen-
dants contend that Kennecott's ore production has escaped taxa-
tion, and that much of its land simply must have escaped taxa-
tion because it is valued at $10 per acre. Those assertions, 
however, flatly ignore the fact that Kennecott is valued at $10 
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1cre plus two times "net proceeds,• which, as explained, is 
tied to profitability. While it may be true that the 
,_,,ner of any other property, such as our hypothetical rancher, 
would not have his land assessed at $10 per acre, it is also 
true that the income of that property owner would not be taken 
into consideration in determining the valuation of his prop-
erty. Thus, certain factors may appear to have been "omitted" 
from Kennecott's assessment had that assessment been made by 
the method the County uses. But it does not follow at all that 
Kennecott's property escaped assessment under the totally 
different method statutorily mandated for assessing mines that 
was applied. 
It is clear that Section 59-5-17 applies only to 
actual omissions, and does not apply to underassessments of 
tnown property. The statute was held applicable in the case of 
Union Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 Utah 335, 230 P. 
1020 (1924) because in that case, the taxpayer completely 
omitted a substantial structure from the affidavit it submitted 
for purposes of taxation. However, in the case of Ririe v. 
Randolph, 51 Utah 274, 169 P. 941 (1917), the assessor used a 
wholly erroneous formula for assessing coal lands. There, the 
Supreme Court tersely held that the escaped-property provision 
did not apply. 
Reading section 59-5-17 as applying only to omitted 
not to property that may have arguably been assessed 
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incorrectly, is necessary to harmonize the Port land dr,, 
Ririe cases. Moreover, such a reading is necessary to give 
meaning to the provisions of S.B. 208, supra. In this case, 
the County defendants are apparently arguing that Section 
59-5-17 gives the State Tax Commission carte blanche to correct 
assessments that the County contends may have been erroneous 
for a period of up to five years. But if that is so, then the 
limited protest period provided for in S.B. 208 is either mean-
ingless or it has repealed Section 59-5-17. Kennecott 
suggests, of course, that this Court construe the two statutes 
so as to give meaning to both, which can be done by holding 
that the five-year provision in Section 59-5-17 applies only to 
escaped property. 
VI. THE SECOND CROSS-CLAIM IS NOW MOOT, AND 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
In their second cross-claim, the County defendants 
requested access to certain assessment books required to be 
kept by the State Tax Commission. S.B. 184, enacted by the 
1983 Legislature, specifically granted counties the right to 
look at those books. That provides the counties with the full 
relief they seek in all the future cases. If such information 
becomes necessary in the context of this litigation, the infor-
mation would be obtainable through normal discovery proce-
du res. Thus, there is no need to maintain the second cross-
claim, and it should be dismissed as moot. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This 11t1gation began when Kennecott challenged the 
,, 0 nstitut ionality of Utah Code Ann. 
county assessors to base taxation 
S 59-5-4. 5, which directed 
on 80 percent of the fair 
cash value of county-assessed property, rather than on 100 per-
cent of that fair cash value. Because the provision did not 
apply to state-assessed property, such as Kennecott's, Kenne-
cott's taxes were increased. The statute was upheld below. 
While Kennecott has appealed that decision, the issue was 
already under submission before this Court in an identical 
case. This action is an appeal by the County defendants from 
the lower court's dismissal of their counterclaim and two 
cross-claims. 
The counterclaim against Kennecott is based in s1g-
n1f1cant part on the notion that Kennecott placed its valuation 
at issue by initiating this lawsuit. such is not the case. 
Kennecott is not contesting anyone's valuation or appraisal, 
but is contesting its taxation. Thus, Kennecott is not 
required to justify the State Tax Commission's valuation of its 
property in order to bring this lawsuit any more than the 
County defendants need to justify all of their valuations in 
"tder to defend against Kennecott's claims. Nor do the County 
,JGfendants have an implied or inherent right to bring the coun-
tPrcla1m. As the State defendants argued below, the County 
lacks standing to do so. Even if it had such standing, the 
must be dismissed because the relief sought 
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judicial valuation of Kennecott's property -- is unavallaLJ, 
Utah's constitution makes the State Tax Commission responsible 
for valuing mines, and that constitutional provision cannot bo 
ignored by this Court. 
The first cross-claim should be dismissed for similar 
reasons. The 1983 Legislature amended Utah's tax statutes to 
specifically give counties 
valuation to the State Tax 
the right to protest 
Commission. However, 
a taxpayer's 
the statute 
also imposes upon the County the same rigid time requirements 
for bringing such a protest as have always been imposed on tax-
payers. The County made no protest in this case. 
the legislation is a recognition that prior to its 
the counties had no standing to protest valuations. 
Arguably, 
adoption, 
But if the 
legislation were merely a codification of pre-existing implied 
powers, and if the counties have always been on an equal foot-
ing with the taxpayers, then the counties must also have been 
implicitly bound by the same time limitations as the taxpayers, 
as was made explicit in the statute. Thus, if the County 
defendants ever had standing to seek State Tax Commission 
re-valuation of Kennecott's property, the time for bringing 
such an action has passed. Because of relief sought on the 
first cross-claim is not legally available, its dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
Finally, the relief sought in the second cross-claim 
has been provided by recent legislation, and the issue is no" 
moot. 
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For al 1 of the foregoing reasons, this Court should 
, '' "' the lower court's dismissal of the County defendants' 
uunLerclaim and cross-claims. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;)_ 71'----day of July, 1983. 
/OOHN F. WALDO 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Kennecott Corporation 
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